Should the citizens of a democratic state be free to communicate over electronic networks hardened against any government surveillance? To some the answer will seem obvious: No. Ever since telephony was invented, solving or preventing violent crime has often involved tapping people’s phones. When digital networks replaced mechanical exchanges in the 1990s, governments demanded that they should still be able to listen ing.通过需要防止任何政府窥视的电子网络通信——民主国家的公民应当享有这样的权利吗？对某些人来说，答案或许是显而易见的：不应当。自从发明者电话以来，解决问题或制止暴力犯罪活动的方法往往还包括监听人们的电话。当上世纪90年代数字网络代替机械式交换机的时候，各国政府拒绝，他们仍不应需要展开监听。David Cameron is among those who argue that the advent of the internet should not upset that apparent balance between security and privacy. Speaking in January, the British prime minister pointed out that it has always been “possible to read someone’s letter, to listen to someone’s call”, and insisted that he was not “going to allow a means of communication where it simply is not possible to do that”. Many understood him to be taking aim at internet communications services that use end-to-end encryption, a now-common technology that makes it impossible to read messages even if they are intercepted in transit.一些人坚称，互联网的问世不不应妨碍安全性和隐私之间的显著均衡，英国首相戴维?卡梅伦(David Cameron)就是其中之一。

卡梅伦在今年1月公开发表演讲时认为，“看某人的信件和监听某人的电话”仍然是做到获得的，并否认，他会“容许妨碍这一点的通信方式”。许多人指出他针对的是用于末端到末端加密的互联网通信服务。末端到末端加密是目前广泛用于的一种技术，它让信息在传输过程中即使被截击也无法加载。Many people will agree with Mr Cameron. True, they will say, the state must respect the rule of law. But they pose a reasonable question: so long as it does, why should new technology trump its demands for information? Here are three reasons why it should.许多人将不会表示同意卡梅伦的观点。

他们不会说道，到底，政府必需认同法治，但合理的问题是：只要政府认同法治，新技术为何应当制止它对信息的拒绝呢？这里有三个理由。First, while legitimate eavesdropping could be implemented without making telephones less useful, there is no way of guaranteeing the state unfettered access to online communications without making the internet vastly less useful even for lawful purposes.Traditional telephone systems were run by large companies or governments themselves. An entire industry was built, in effect, on a single application: letting people speak at a distance. The experience of using a phone in 1990 was little different from 1950. Regulating the unchanging service of a single company can be done without creating much friction.The internet has evolved in a wildly different way. It supports applications written by anyone. To restrict how a coder might build an internet application is to place an enormous weight on slender shoulders. Every software developer would have to be a professional operation with an army of compliance lawyers, or risk breaking the rules. In the worst case, software development would be relegated to a handful of government-friendly incumbents. The best case, so far as the advocates of surveillance are concerned, would be one where software developers avoid the lawyers but give up on encryption entirely. But this is a nightmare, from the public’s point of view and even the state’s: it exposes communications to anyone willing to do a bit of hacking. Telephone eavesdropping never ran such risks. For anyone other than the authorised agents of the state, it was comparatively difficult to listen in to someone’s call. Second, on the internet, enabling surveillance means requiring the people who build communications apps and services to make sure they are breakable. But this concession to lawful snoopers would also be a gift to states that do not embrace the rule of law. For the billions of people who live in such countries, western technology has offered a rare glimpse of the freedom to communicate. Authoritarian governments have had to invest enormous effort in trying to connect with the world while still permitting censorship and surveillance. If western governments succeed in shaping our software so that we cannot keep secrets from authorities bearing warrants, they will also stop people keeping secrets from regimes that do not bother with formalities. Third, a more practical point: it is very, very difficult to design a communications system that allows messages to be intercepted by the government but otherwise keeps them secure from prying eyes. The chance of error is high. Then, sensitive information risks falling into the wrong hands — a worse outcome than if the communicating parties had not had access to encryption at all. I understand the imperative to provide security. It makes sense that the boundary between state and citizen should be drawn by a democratic process — not determined by a cat-and-mouse contest between programmers. I sympathise with the alarm that law enforcers feel when communications threaten to “go dark”. But banning strong encryption is no solution. The internet has been a force for modern ity and openness — exactly what those who believe in indiscriminate violence despise. We must not build them a more agreeable network in the name of a short-term imperative to uncover and prevent their worst. The writer is a professor of law and computer science at Harvard University首先，对于电话网络，可以在不减少电话简单性的同时展开合法的监听，但对于互联网，如果让政府不受约束地取得通信内容，不免大幅度减少互联网（即便用作合法目的）的简单性。传统的电话系统是由大公司或政府自己运营的。

实质上，整个行业都创建在一项单一应用于的基础之上：让人们远距离通话。在1990年用于电话的经历与1950年没什么有所不同。政府可以在不引发多少摩擦的情况下，监管一家公司一成不变的服务。

互联网的发展方式截然不同。它反对任何人撰写的应用于。限定版编码人员建构互联网应用于的方式，是在让粗壮的肩膀挑重担。每个软件开发者将被迫是配有合规律师的专业化运营团队，否则就有可能违规。

在最坏的情况下，软件开发将被少数几家与政府关系密切的老牌公司掌控。对赞同监听的人士来说，最差的情况将是软件开发者不请求律师，而是几乎退出加密。但从公众甚至政府的角度来看，这几乎是一场噩梦：它不会让通信内容曝露于任何想要做黑客活动的人面前。

电话监听根本没此类风险。对除了政府许可人员以外的任何人来说，监听某人的电话比较艰难。

第二，就互联网而言，为监听创造条件，意味著让通信应用于和服务开发者保证他们的应用于是可以攻陷的。但这种对合法监听者的妥协也将不利于不认同法治的政府。

对数十亿生活在此类国家的人们来说，西方技术以求让他们绝佳地滋味通信权利的滋味。威权政府被迫投放极大的希望，在与世界相连的同时，依然需要展开审查和监听。如果西方国家政府顺利地影响软件开发，从而让我们无法对取得法庭许可的有关部门激进秘密，同时也将让我们无法对不必费心回头法律程序的政权激进秘密。

第三点也是更加现实的一点：设计一套需要让政府截击、但会让其他人窥视的通信系统是十分艰难的。错误的几率十分低。

因此，脆弱信息很有可能落到不法分子之手，这种结果比通信各方几乎不加密更为差劲。我明白政府有适当确保安全性。

政府与公民之间的界限应当由民主过程划界，而不是由程序员之间像猫抓老鼠那样的竞争要求，这很有道理。当通信有可能隐蔽一起的时候，我同情执法人员部门的情绪。

但禁令极强加密不是解决办法。联网仍然是现代性和开放性的推动者，而现代与对外开放正是那些改信欺诈暴力的人所不愿看见的。我们无法以短期有适当找到和制止他们的最险恶用心为由，为他们打造出一个更容易攻陷的网络。

本文来源：万博max体育(manbetx)·官方网站-www.yiying995.com